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THE GARCETTI VIRUS
Nancy M. Modesitt*
In an era where corporate malfeasance has imposed staggering costs on
society, ranging from the largest oil spill in recorded history to the
largest government bailout of Wall Street, one would think that those who
uncover corporate wrongdoing before it causes significant harm should
receive awards. Employees are particularly well-placed to uncover such
wrongdoing within companies. However, rather than reward these
employees, employers tend to fire or marginalize them. While there are
statutory protections for whistleblowers, a disturbing new trend appears
to be developing: courts are excluding from the protection of
whistleblowing statutes employees who report wrongdoing as part of
their jobs. Under this doctrine, the internal safety inspector who
uncovers illegal behavior while performing his duties and reports it to his
boss can legally be fired for blowing the whistle.
This Article explains how this doctrine, the job duties exclusion, was
developed by the Federal Circuit over a decade ago to limit claims
brought by federal employees under the federal Whistleblower Protection
Act. Flawed at its inception, the doctrine languished, with no states
adopting it until the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos. In
Garcetti, the Court applied the job duties exclusion to a claim brought
under the First Amendment.
Even though Garcetti involved a
constitutional, not a statutory, claim, the decision has given new life to
the doctrine developed by the Federal Circuit. Since Garcetti, courts
have begun applying the job duties exclusion to state statutory
whistleblower claims, placing protections for employees at grave risk.
This Article examines this developing trend, explaining how Garcetti has
had an impact on what is fundamentally a state statutory interpretation
issue. It identifies the flaws of the job duties exclusion as first
articulated, the reasons why state courts should not apply it to state
whistleblower protection statutes, and recommends that legislatures
amend statutory protections to ensure that employees who do the right
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thing and report corporate malfeasance are protected against retaliation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 the Supreme Court effectively discouraged
federal and state employees from blowing the whistle on governmental
wrongdoing by adopting a limitation on these employees‘ First
Amendment rights. Specifically, the Court held that governmental
employees are not engaged in protected speech for First Amendment
purposes where the employees‘ speech is made pursuant to their official
duties.2 Thus, when an employee is performing his job, uncovers illegal
behavior, and reports it through the proper chain of command, his
speech in disclosing the governmental wrongdoing is not protected by

1. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
2. Id. at 421.
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the First Amendment.3
One of the justifications for the Court‘s decision was that government
employees have other protections provided by a variety of state and
federal statutes against retaliation when the employee engages in
whistleblowing.4 Ironically, while the Garcetti Court relied upon these
protections to justify the decision, Garcetti itself appears to be placing
these protections at risk. Despite significant criticism in the popular
press and scholarly literature,5 the ―job duties exclusion‖ articulated in
Garcetti has slowly begun to spread. Employers have increasingly
argued for its application to state statutes protecting public and private
sector employees, with some success. If this developing trend
continues, it represents a significant threat to whistleblowing behavior,
as those most likely to notice employer wrongdoing are the employees
who see it firsthand as part of their jobs.
This Article contains four parts. Part II traces the historical
development of the job duties exclusion, which was created long before
Garcetti as a limitation on federal employee whistleblowing claims
brought under the Whistleblower Protection Act. Part III examines the
substance and effect of the exclusion and concludes that it unjustifiably
threatens the goals of whistleblower protection statutes. Part IV
explores the post-Garcetti expansion of the exclusion, including the
extent of this developing trend and why it is occurring. Part V argues
that Congress and state legislatures should amend whistleblower
protection statutes to eliminate the potential for the application of this
exclusion and that judges should stop the spread of this trend by
rejecting arguments for its application to state statutes.

3. See id. This Article refers to this limitation on whistleblowing protections as the ―job duties
exclusion.‖
4. Id. at 425 (noting the ―powerful network of legislative enactments—such as whisteblower
protection laws and labor codes‖ and citing the federal Whisteblower Protection Act as an example of
such protections).
5. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117 (2008); Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation:
Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 22 (2008); Christie S. Totten, Quieting Disruption: The Mistake of Curtailing Public Employees'
Free Speech under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233 (2008). But see Andrew
Bernie, A Principled Limitation on Judicial Interference: Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006),
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1047 (2007).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOB DUTIES EXCLUSION
At present, there are four potential sources of whistleblowing
protection for employees: (1) common law claims for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy,6 which are generally available
only to private sector employees;7 (2) constitutional claims for
infringement on First Amendment rights, which are available only to
public sector (governmental) employees;8 (3) generalized statutory
prohibitions on retaliation against whistleblowers, which are available to
nearly all state and federal government employees as well as some
private sector employees;9 and (4) topic-specific statutory prohibitions
on retaliation against whistleblowers who report wrongdoing in specific
statutory contexts, which vary from statute to statute as to whether they
apply to public sector employees, private sector employees, or both.10
In order to understand the development of the job duties exclusion, it
is necessary to understand the history of whistleblowing protection,
including the development of these four modern types of whistleblowing
protection.
A Brief History of Whistleblower Protection
The history of whistleblowing protections in the United States is well
documented.11 This area of law developed slowly and began with
modest efforts that did not truly protect whistleblowers at all. The False
Claims Act (FCA), which was passed during the Civil War, created a
bounty system for those who disclosed fraud perpetrated against the

6. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (describing claim).
7. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
(noting that no common law claim for wrongful discharge exists for public sector employees).
8. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (describing parameters of the claim).
9. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE apps. A, B (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2010) (listing statutes).
10. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
11. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9; Roberta Ann Johnson, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN
IT WORKS—AND WHY, 94–95 (2001); Wim Vandekerckhove, WHISTLEBLOWING AND
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT, 164–85 (2006); Mary Kreiner
Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN.
L. REV. 183, 191–95 (2007).
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government.12 At that time, the concern was focused on fraud
perpetrated by contractors/suppliers in the war effort. As a result, the
FCA created a bounty system whereby the reporter of the wrongdoing
was given a share of the recovery. However, the FCA provided no
protections to prevent retaliation against the whistleblower; if the
whistleblower was an employee of the contractor, the contractor was
free to fire, demote, suspend, or reprimand the employee.13
The next step in the development of whistleblowing protections was
the recognition of anti-retaliation rights for employees engaging in
union-organizing activities, which developed during the early labor
movement.14 The Railway Labor Act, for example, passed in 1926, was
the first act to prohibit employers from retaliating against employees
who promoted, organized, or joined labor unions.15 Protection for
workers outside of the railroads came with the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) during the Great Depression, which
prohibited discrimination against employees in order to encourage or
discourage membership in a union.16
The number of federal laws containing prohibitions on employer
retaliation against employees has increased in the decades since the
NLRA. Antiretaliation provisions are now found in dozens of federal
laws, ranging from the little-known Asbestos Hazard Emergency
Response Act17 to the well-known protections contained in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 In addition to the increasing number of
federal statutes protecting employees against retaliation, the scope of
protection against retaliation by employers has become more
encompassing over time. For instance, Title VII prohibits retaliation
against employees who oppose employer conduct made unlawful by
12. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 4. For a more detailed description of the
history of whistleblower protections, see WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at ch. 1.
13. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 4.
14. See id.; Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433, 443 (2009) (noting 1986 amendment to the FCA to protect
employee-whistleblowers from retaliation).
15. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006).
18. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at app. C (listing federal laws protecting
employees against retaliation).
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Title VII or participate in any Title VII investigation or proceeding.19
Courts have construed these provisions to prohibit retaliation even
against former employees.20
Part of the reason for the increase in the number and scope of
protections for employee whistleblowers can be attributed to the
development of greater governmental oversight and regulation of
corporations and industry.21 For instance, the early environmental
protection movement and the civil rights movement spawned legislation
regulating companies. The package of legislative limitations on
corporate freedom included protections for whistleblowers.22
All of the above statutes prohibiting retaliation are topic-specific
statutes; that is, they provide retaliation protection only for
whistleblowing on a particular topic, such as employers engaging in
unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII. 23 This topicspecific approach was the first stage in the development of modern
statutory employee whistleblower protections. As some of the topicspecific statutory whistleblower protections were being enacted,
legislators began developing generalized employee whistleblower
protections as well. The development of generalized whistleblower
protection for employees took three separate routes: (1) common law,
(2) constitutional, and (3) statutory protections.
Common law protections were developed by the states as an
exception to the employment at-will regime that governs the vast
majority of employees in the private sector.24 This common law claim,
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, is a tort-based remedy
for employees whose employers fired them for exposing employer
wrongdoing.25 The core concept of this claim is that while employers
can fire employees for any or no reason, they cannot fire employees for
reasons that would violate ―public policy.‖26 In one of the earliest cases
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
Robinson v. Shell Oil, Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 7–9.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 16–17.
See STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 21 (2001).
Id. at 23.
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to apply this protection, Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, the
California Court of Appeals held than an employee had a claim for
wrongful discharge where he was fired for refusing to follow his
employer‘s instructions to commit perjury.27
Since that decision courts have broadened the scope of protected
behavior.28 Today, claims generally have been recognized where
employees have been fired for (1) refusing to violate a statute, (2)
performing a statutory obligation, (3) exercising a statutory right or
privilege, and (4) reporting a statutory violation.29
While the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim was
not developed specifically or solely for whistleblowers, it can be a
significant source of protection for them.30 Nearly every state
recognizes some form of the wrongful discharge claim; however, the
parameters of the claim vary widely, meaning that whether an
employee-whistleblower is protected will vary significantly from state to
state.31 These common law protections generally apply only to private
sector employees.
While public sector employees generally lack access to the common
law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, in the
decade after the seminal Petermann case was decided, the U.S. Supreme
Court opened the door to whistleblower retaliation claims for
government employees under the First Amendment. In Pickering v.
Board of Education,32 the Court held that the First Amendment could
protect employee statements criticizing their employers if the employee
spoke on a matter of public concern.33 In Pickering, the employee was a
teacher who publicly spoke against the need for additional school

27. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
28. See KOHN, supra note 25, at 23.
29. See Gannt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (discussing the generally accepted
formulation of the claim); see also KOHN, supra note 25, at 23.
30. Note that the first three claims do not involve disclosure of employer wrongdoing, which is
the hallmark of whistleblower protection statutes. These cases focus instead on forcing employers to
respect the law and, in particular, to respect employees‘ statutory rights and obligations.
31. For a discussion of the variations among state common law claims, see WESTMAN &
MODESITT, supra note 9, at ch. 5, app. D.
32. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
33. Id. at 568.
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funding.34 The teacher vocally expressed a belief that the school district
had improperly allocated funds in the past as a reason for the funding
opposition. While this disclosure of mishandling funds could make the
employee a whistleblower, the school district fired the employee for
opposing the funding, not primarily because of the disclosure of wasted
funds, which could be seen as whistleblowing behavior. The focus of
Pickering‘s claim, and many other subsequent First Amendment claims,
was not primarily on whistleblowing but on the more general right of
employees to voice disagreements with employers. 35 Thus, cases
involving clashes of political opinions drove the initial development of
this constitutional protection for public employees.36
Subsequent cases clarified that a balancing test would be used to
determine whether the speech could be protected. This test balanced the
employer‘s legitimate interests in running the workplace effectively and
the employee‘s free speech interests.37 Under the line of cases applying
this test, state and federal employees who disclosed unlawful conduct at
work might be protected from retaliation under the First Amendment if
the unlawful conduct were a matter of public concern and the
disruptions caused by the whistleblowing behavior were not too great.38
Soon after the development of the common law and constitutional
claims that provided some protection for some whistleblowing
employees, legislators began to enact generalized statutory protections.
These generalized whistleblower protection statutes were initially
focused on government employees at both the federal and state level.
For example, the federal government led the way by passing the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978.39 This law provided whistleblower
protections to civil service employees who reported fraud, illegal
conduct, or mismanagement in the federal government.40 The states

34. Id. at 566–67.
35. See id. at 568–69.
36. See, e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (involving an employee who was
terminated for speaking critically of the president); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987)
(regarding the firing of employees due to political associations).
37. See Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Rankin, 483 U.S. 1056.
38. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152–53.
39. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
40. Id.
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then followed suit by passing whistleblower protection statutes covering
state (and sometimes local) employees. Now nearly every state has
enacted some type of whistleblower protection statute for state
employees.41 These statutes vary greatly from state to state in terms of
protected disclosures, remedies to employees, and to whom the
disclosures can be made.42
Legislatures have been much slower to pass generalized
whistleblower protections for private sector employees. There is no
federal statute providing generalized whistleblowing protections for
employees in the private sector. At the state level, less than half of the
states have enacted generalized whistleblower protection statutes for
private sector employees.43 Like state statutes for public employees,
statutes governing the private sector also vary greatly. 44
Within this mix of whistleblowing protections, the job duties
exclusion was created in one small corner: under the federal
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA).45 The WPA amended the
Civil Service Reform Act of 197846 and expanded the general
whistleblowing protections it provided.
B. The Whistleblower Protection Act: The Source of the Job Duties
Exclusion
The source of the job duties exclusion lies with the interpretations of
the WPA.47 Prior to the WPA, protection of whistleblowers had been

41. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at app. A (listing state statutes).
42. See id.; see also State Whistleblower Laws—Overview, PUB. EMPS. FOR ENVTL.
RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.peer.org/docs/wbp2/overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (identifying
different protections afforded by state whistleblower laws).
43. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 77; see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra
note 9, at 4-2 (Supp. 2010).
44. See id.
45. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
46. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
47. It is more accurate to state that the courts are interpreting the WPA and the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 together because the WPA merely amended the Civil Service Reform Act.
However, the court decisions in this area generally refer to the WPA as the source of whisteblower
protection, perhaps as a shorthand for both statutes, a practice this Article will follow. The primary antiretaliation provisions of the Act are found at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302 (West 2008).
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provided as part of the general civil service laws. 48 The WPA revised
and, in general, increased the protections afforded to whistleblowers.49
This encouraged greater protection of whistleblowers by the federal
Office of Special Counsel—the office charged with investigating
whistleblowing complaints.50
The WPA prohibits the federal government, as an employer, from
firing, retaliating against, or threatening to retaliate against employees
who engage in protected behavior.51 The WPA defines this protected
behavior as ―any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant
which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences (1) a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (2) gross mismanagement, a
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety.‖52 In addition, employees are
protected when they exercise a statutory right, testify regarding a
protected disclosure, cooperate with or disclose information to an
Inspector General when required by law, or refuse to obey an illegal
order.53
Claims brought under the WPA are heard first by the Merit Systems

48. Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope For
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991).
49. For instance, prior to the WPA, if a federal agency could establish that it would have taken
action against a whisteblower even if the employee had not blown the whistle, the claim was barred.
However, the WPA revised this requirement by allowing the claim to stand so long as the
whistleblowing was a factor in the decision, even if, on balance, the agency would have taken the action
anyway. Id. at 377–380. One scholar noted that the WPA was one more step in the ―minuet‖ of
whisteblower protections; in this dance, Congress attempts to enact greater protections, taking one step
forward, while the federal courts circumscribe the effective scope of these protections through their
decisions ―interpreting‖ federal law. Id. at 361.
50. Id. at 371.
51. The adverse employment actions that are prohibited are: ―(i) an appointment; (ii) a
promotion; (iii) an action under chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or corrective action; (iv) a
detail, transfer, or reassignment; (v) a reinstatement; (vi) a restoration; (vii) a reemployment; (viii) a
performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title; (ix) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or
awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training may reasonably be expected to
lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action described in this
subparagraph; (x) a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination; and (xi) any other significant
change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.‖ 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a)(2)(A) (West 2008).
52. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2008).
53. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(9) (West 2008).
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Protection Board (MSPB),54 which is the governmental entity primarily
responsible for claims brought by federal employees who have been
fired, demoted, or disciplined.55 An administrative judge initially
decides these cases, which can then be appealed to the Board itself. 56 If
the employee is dissatisfied with the Board‘s decision, the employee
may elect to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which has the sole authority to decide these appeals.57
In 1998 the Federal Circuit heard the issue of whether an employee
performing normal job duties was entitled to protections against
retaliation if, in the course of performing his duties, he reported the type
of wrongdoing covered by the WPA.58 In Willis v. Department of
Agriculture, an employee in the Department of Agriculture reported to
his supervisor his belief that some of the supervisor‘s actions were
improper. Specifically, the employee had determined that a number of
farms were not in compliance with a government soil-protection
program. The supervisor disagreed and overruled the employee‘s
decisions in six out of the seven situations at issue. The employee
subsequently complained about the supervisor‘s decision and alleged
that he was retaliated against for his complaint.59
The Federal Circuit determined that these complaints were not
protected disclosures under the WPA because they were merely typical
54. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) (2006). In a few instances, the claims follow an entirely different
administrative procedure. If the employee is also claiming unlawful employment discrimination, a
pendant whistleblowing claim would be heard as part of that discrimination case. There, the case is
decided by an administrative judge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
appeals are made to the Office of Federal Operations within the EEOC. If the employee is dissatisfied
with the administrative decision, the employee can bring suit in federal district court (generally the
federal district court for the district where the employee is employed). The result of these different
procedural processes is that while most WPA claims are decided by the Federal Circuit, there are still a
few that are decided by the various federal district and circuit courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702 (2006).
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (2006) (noting that appeal rights for performance-based disciplinary
actions exist only for demotions or terminations); 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006) (describing MSPB appellate
procedures). Only significant disciplinary decisions—discharge, demotion, and lengthy suspension—
are heard by the MSPB. Lesser disciplinary actions such as reprimands and short suspensions are left to
the employing agency to decide on its own.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1) (2006). While the statute provides that the MSPB may hear the case
itself, it is routine to refer these cases to administrative judges for the initial hearing.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (2006).
58. Willis v. Dep‘t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
59. Id. at 1141.
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disagreements between supervisor and employee.60 The court expressed
concern that were the WPA to cover this type of situation, far too many
typical disagreements would be the basis for a WPA claim.61 The court
further explained its decision:
Part of Willis's job duties . . . was to review the conservation compliance
of farms within his area. In reporting some of them as being out of
compliance, he did no more than carry out his required everyday job
responsibilities. This is expected of all government employees pursuant
to the fiduciary obligation which every employee owes to his employer.
Willis cannot be said to have risked his personal job security by merely
performing his required duties. Determining whether or not farms were
out of compliance was part of his job performance and in no way did it
place Willis at personal risk for the benefit of the public good and cannot
itself constitute a protected disclosure under the WPA.62

In reaching its decision that the disclosures were not protected, the
court failed to consider the language of the statute or its legislative
history. The court failed to discuss the fact that the statute‘s language
covers ―any disclosure‖—language lacking any limitation on the type of
disclosure, the individual‘s reason for making the disclosure, or whether
the employee‘s job involves reporting wrongdoing. The only portion of
the court‘s explanation that can be read as conducting statutory
interpretation is its assertion that the goal of the WPA was to protect
employees who risk their job security by reporting certain types of
misconduct.63
The court jumped from this proposition to two conclusions without
any support from the text of the WPA, its legislative history, or the
policies underlying it. First, the court concluded that performing
obligatory job duties does not entail risking one‘s job security; thus, the
conduct is not protected.64 However, it is quite possible that employees
performing their normal job duties who expose wrongdoing are risking
their job security. There are three possible reactions to exposing
wrongdoing that such employees may face in the workplace. First, the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1143.
Id.
Id. at 1144.
See id.
Willis v. Dep‘t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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employee‘s supervisor may affirmatively want the employee to disclose
all wrongdoing. In this situation, the employee will not be facing
reprisal for whistleblowing and, therefore, will have no need for
protection. Second, the supervisor may be apathetic as to the disclosure
of wrongdoing. Again, in this situation, the employee will have no need
for protection against retaliation. Third, the supervisor may want
limited or no disclosure of wrongdoing. This may be where the
supervisor has some connection with the wrongdoing or where the
supervisor is concerned about his or her own job security. In this
scenario, by simply doing his job, the employee is risking his job.
Providing protections in this third scenario is precisely the point of
whistleblower protection statutes for employees.
The second conclusion that the Willis court reached was that
Congress did not intend for the WPA to cover nearly every disclosure by
a federal employee of a possible violation of the law.65 The court made
this assertion without providing any support for it.
Three years later, in 2001, the Federal Circuit was forced to revisit the
issue decided in Willis because of confusion over its scope. In Huffman
v. Office of Personnel Management,66 an employee worked in the Office
of the Inspector General (OIG). He reported several different types of
wrongdoing to his supervisor: (1) the supervisor‘s own alleged violation
of law by ―preselecting‖ employees to be hired rather than through the
lawful, merit service process; (2) the supervisor‘s gross mismanagement
and waste in the hiring of a contactor; (3) other employees‘ improper
hiring practices, where employees were hired without a competitive
hiring process in violation of the civil service laws; and (4) another
supervisor directing applicants to falsify their applications for
employment.67
The plaintiff in Huffman alleged that he was retaliated against for
having made the complaints. On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court
held that the WPA protected only some of these complaints of wrongful
behavior.68 The court concluded that the WPA did not protect

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. (discussing the implications of allowing Willis‘s claim to stand).
Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1353.
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disclosures made by an employee as part of his normal job duties.69
However, the court did allow for two exceptions to this general rule.
First, disclosures that were a normal part of the employee‘s job, if made
to someone outside of the normal chain of command, would be
protected. Second, if the type of disclosure were one that the employee
would not ordinarily make, then that disclosure would be protected.70
In concluding that disclosures made pursuant to the employee‘s
normal job duties were not protected, the court reiterated one of the
rationales it expressed in Willis. The court focused on the goal of the
WPA, which the court defined in both Willis and Huffman as protecting
employees who ―go above and beyond the call of duty‖ by disclosing
hidden wrongdoing.71 According to the court, Congress did not intend
to protect employees whose normal job duties require such disclosures.72
While the court in Willis provided no real support for this supposition,
the Huffman court did identify some indirect support by citing to several
statements made during the legislative process, which noted that the
WPA was not designed to protect poor performing employees from
discipline.73 It is unclear how these statements indicate that disclosures
made pursuant to normal job duties should not be covered. Perhaps the
court was suggesting that all whistleblowers whose jobs require
reporting wrongdoing are poor performers seeking to shield themselves
from adverse employment action by claiming protection under the
WPA.
The court also justified its conclusion by determining that the WPA
was ―ambiguous,‖74 despite the fact that just paragraphs earlier the court
had interpreted the same portion of the statute75 without referencing any
ambiguity.76 The court did not rely on one of the key rationales it cited
in Willis—that this was the normal type of disagreement between

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1352.
75. The court failed to specify what aspect of the WPA was ambiguous. However, the language
at issue appears to be the ―any disclosure‖ language.
76. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/4

14

Modesitt: THE GARCETTI VIRUS

2011]

THE GARCETTI VIRUS

175

supervisors and subordinates and thus was not appropriate for protection
under the WPA.
The court‘s analysis is flawed in many ways. First, the Huffman court
began its analysis with an incorrect assessment of the statutory language
by claiming that it was ambiguous77 and, therefore, required analysis of
legislative history. Had the court begun from the normal starting point
of statutory construction, it would have had a difficult time justifying its
conclusion. The statute states that ―any disclosure‖ of illegal activity,
gross mismanagement, or waste of government funds is protected
activity.78 The statute provides no limitation as to whom the disclosure
must be made. The plain language is unambiguous and thus supports
the interpretation that a disclosure made in the course of one‘s normal
job duties is protected. Furthermore, the lack of an express exclusion
should be considered in light of the fact that many whistleblower
statutes do specify to whom protected disclosures must be made.79
Therefore, in these jurisdictions, disclosures made in the course of
performing one‘s job may not be protected in all circumstances; instead,
protections will depend on the person to whom the disclosure is made.80
The Huffman court was also incorrect in its assertion that there was
―no clear evidence in the legislative history‖ of the WPA to support the
idea that disclosures made in the course of an employee‘s normal job
duties were covered by the WPA.81
The WPA amended the
whistleblower provisions created by the Civil Service Act of 1978.
Under that statute, ―a disclosure‖ was protected if it met certain criteria.
The WPA changed the statutory language from ―a disclosure‖ to ―any
disclosure,‖ indicating that a broader meaning should be used.82 Further
solidifying this evidence of intent to provide coverage to more
disclosures than under the CSRA is a 1988 report discussing the
77. Id.
78. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2008).
79. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 70–71, app. A at 281, app. B at 309 (compiling
state statutes protecting whistleblowers and noting that many contain such limitations).
80. Some states have imposed limitations on the type of disclosure that is protected. The most
common type is that the disclosure must be made in good faith. This is a far narrower limitation on
protections than the job duties exclusion, as it focuses on the employee‘s motivation in making the
disclosure. See, e.g., Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000).
81. Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
82. See S. REP. NO. 100-413, at 13 (1988).
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proposed WPA. In this report, a Senate Committee noted:
For example, it is inappropriate for disclosures to be protected only if
they are made for certain purposes or to certain employee or only if the
employee is the first to raise the issue. S. 508 emphasizes this point by
changing the phrase ‗a disclosure‘ to ‗any disclosure‘ in the statutory
definition.83

Thus, the plain language and legislative history of the WPA are at odds
with the Huffman decision.
Looking beyond the plain language and legislative history, the
Huffman court also adopted the Willis conclusion that an employee
executing his normal job duties and thereby disclosing wrongdoing is
not risking his job and therefore not a person who should be entitled to
protection.84 As noted above, there are significant flaws in this
conclusion.
Huffman has been applied in numerous cases since its decision and
remains unquestioned in the Federal Circuit.85 Indeed, Huffman‘s scope
has expanded over the years because the Federal Circuit has broadly
interpreted the scope of what constitutes disclosures made pursuant to
normal job duties. For example, in a broad interpretation of the job
duties exclusion, the Federal Circuit determined that where an
employee‘s normal job duties are to investigate wrongdoing and that
employee voluntarily follows up on an initial report of wrongdoing,
disclosures made pursuant to that voluntary work are also not
protected.86 The court justified its decision by asserting that follow-up
work—even if it is not required by an employer—is a normal part of
one‘s job and, therefore, falls within the scope of the Huffman
decision.87
C. Other Federal Statutes: Generally, No Job Duties Exclusion
Huffman and Willis are not the only decisions grappling with the
83.
84.
85.
positive.
86.
87.

Id.
Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1353.
A current KeyCite search of Huffman reveals over 370 citing references, almost exclusively
Fields v. Dep‘t of Justice, 452 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1305.
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question of whether disclosures made pursuant to one‘s job duties would
be protected by a federal statute prohibiting retaliation against
employees.88 Courts have addressed this situation in cases involving the
anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). In these cases, courts responded to the job duties issue in a
fundamentally different manner than the Huffman and Willis courts. In
Title VII and FLSA cases, courts have considered the precise statutory
language to determine whether job-related disclosures of wrongdoing
are protected rather than relying upon the judicially-created job duties
exclusion. While the anti-retaliation language in these statutes differ,89
like the WPA, neither of them contain any language expressly excluding
from coverage those employees who disclose unlawful conduct as part
of their job duties.90
Perhaps because of this, for many years, the job duties exclusion was
not developed or discussed. Title VII provides an interesting example
because its anti-retaliation provisions have existed for half a century.
These provisions provide protection for two forms of employee conduct:
(1) conduct opposing unlawful employment discrimination and (2)
conduct where an employee participates in a Title VII proceeding or
investigation.91 Employees in human resources are an obvious target for
the job duties exclusion, as they must frequently assess and report to
supervisors whether unlawful discrimination has occurred. The job
duties exclusion argument would be that those who report unlawful
discrimination as part of their jobs, such as human resources personnel
who report violations of Title VII to their supervisors, are not entitled to
protection against retaliation under Title VII.
Rather than adopting a per se exclusion for those whose jobs involve
88. As discussed above, in addition to generalized whistleblower protection statutes, some
whistleblowers are also protected under other, topic-specific federal statutes. Probably the best-known
of these types of whistleblower protections is found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
protects employees who oppose unlawful employment discrimination or participate in a Title VII
proceeding or investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). Environmental protection statutes also
contain protections for whistleblowers; for instance, the Clean Air Act contains a provision prohibiting
retaliation against employees who commence proceedings or assist in enforcement of the Act. 42
U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2006).
89. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) with 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) (2006).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
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the investigation and participation in discrimination claims, courts have
assessed each situation on a case-by-case basis. For example, in 1986,
the Sixth Circuit addressed a retaliation claim of a human resources
employee.92 The court did not mention the idea of a per se job duties
exclusion at all.93 Instead, the court focused on the particular actions of
the employee and whether the employee‘s conduct opposed unlawful
discrimination, whether the employee participated in a Title VII
investigation or proceeding, or instead, whether the employee was a
passive observer.94 Merely acting as a scribe to document claims of
discrimination was held insufficient to be protected activity due to the
lack of active participation or opposition.95 Other cases also show an
analysis of the particular conduct of the plaintiff in each case and
include no discussion of a categorical exclusion for reports made as a
part of one‘s job.96
The approach courts used for interpreting Title VII is similar to that
used for interpreting the FLSA. For instance, in McKenzie v. Renberg’s,
Inc.97 the court examined a human resources employee‘s actions to
determine whether she had engaged in protected activity under the
FLSA. The FLSA protects employees who file a complaint or bring a
claim under the FLSA or who testify in any proceeding under the Act.98
The court was unwilling to allow a claim by an employee who raised

92. Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1986).
93. At one point, the court indirectly suggested that the prevailing thinking might go in the
opposite direction when it stated that, ―[a]n employee does not receive special protection under Title VII
simply because the employee handles discrimination complaints . . . .‖ Id. at 751.
94. See id.
95. Interestingly, this passive versus active participation rationale is now of questionable
validity. In 2009, the Supreme Court determined that an employee who was merely responded to a
company‘s questions regarding a co-worker‘s allegations of sexual harassment was protected against
retaliation for providing information that supported the co-worker‘s allegations. Crawford v. Metro.
Gov‘t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
96. See, e.g., EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that human resources
employee who refused to implement an order violating Title VII engaged in protected activity); Matta v.
Snow, No. Civ.A. 02-862(CKK), 2005 WL 3454334 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2005) (holding that engaging in
neutral assessment of other employees‘ Title VII complaints was not sufficient to establish protected
activity).
97. McKenzie v. Renberg‘s, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). The FLSA also prohibits retaliation for serving on an
industrial committee, but that was not as issue in this case.
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concerns about other employees‘ rights.99 Focusing on the specific
statutory language, the court noted that the human resources employee
had merely advised the company of potential violations; she had not
filed a complaint nor had she assisted other employees in raising a
complaint.100 On the other hand, where a human resources employee
took the additional step of refusing to obey an order that violated the
FLSA, that conduct was held to be protected.101 Here, again, no
categorical job duties exclusion was adopted.
However, there is one instance of a federal court adopting the job
duties exclusion in interpreting antiretaliation provisions of federal law.
In 2005, a Court of Appeals panel for the Sixth Circuit determined that
when an employee engages in activities that are a part of the employee‘s
job duties, such activities cannot be protected activities under the Clean
Air Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, or the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.102 The plaintiff in Sasse was an Assistant United States
Attorney whose job was to investigate and prosecute environmental
crimes. He alleged that after one such investigation and prosecution, he
was retaliated against by receiving heavier caseloads, worse
assignments, taunting at the office, and the assignment of a drunken
secretary who harassed him.103
The issue of whether the employee‘s actions were protected even
though they were a part of his job duties was one of first impression
under these environmental protection statutes. Rather than drawing
upon the Title VII and/or FLSA cases, which are more similar to the
environmental statutes in the sense that they are topic-specific
whistleblower protections, the court cited to both Huffman and Willis,
99. See McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486.
100. Id. There is language in McKenzie that could be read as consistent with the job duties
exclusion. At one point, the court states that the plaintiff must ―step outside of his or her role‖ as a
human resources employee who advises the employer on conduct in order to engage in protected
activity. See id. at 1486–87. However, until Garcetti, this language had been interpreted to mean that
the employee must act in a way that shows opposition to the employer‘s conduct, not that conduct
undertaken within one‘s normal job duties was unprotected. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 759 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (focusing on employee taking a position adverse to the
company).
101. See Frazier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 1:02CV65090OWWDLB, 2005 WL 1335245
(E.D. Cal. May 3, 2005).
102. Sasse v. U.S. Dep‘t of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 780 (6th Cir. 2005).
103. Id. at 777.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

180

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

and adopted the courts‘ approach.104 The court used one of the
rationales from Huffman and Willis: only employees who risk their job
security by taking steps to protect the public good are protected by
whistleblower provisions and that doing one‘s job does not constitute
risking one‘s own job security.105 As in Huffman and Willis, the court
purported to engage in statutory construction and to rely on the plain
language of the statutes. However, the court actually engaged in even
less statutory interpretation than in Huffman; the court never identified
any language in the statutes that would support the job duties exclusion
and failed to even address the policies underlying the statutes. 106 In fact,
there is nothing in the plain language of the statutes that suggests reports
made pursuant to one‘s job are excluded from coverage of the
statutes.107
Sasse remains the only example of any court adopting the Huffman
job duties exclusion, other than cases brought under the WPA, before
Garcetti.108 It is quite possible that the Huffman job duties exclusion
would have remained in its limited universe in perpetuity had Garcetti
not been decided as it was by the Supreme Court.
III. ASSESSING THE JOB DUTIES EXCLUSION
This Article has already assessed the job duties exclusion as a matter
of statutory interpretation and concluded that the analyses of courts that
have adopted the job duties exclusion are fundamentally flawed.109
Looking beyond the analytical failings of these decisions, the job duties
exclusion is incompatible with the policies behind whistleblower
protection statutes and inconsistent with whistleblowing theory and
research. The job duties exclusion also creates behavioral incentives for
external reporting that are not optimal for individuals or employers.

104. Id. at 780.
105. See id. at 780.
106. See id. at 779–80.
107. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2006); Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(1) (2006).
108. For a complete discussion of the cases citing to Huffman before Garcetti, see Part III.B.,
infra.
109. See supra Part II.C.
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A. Incompatibility with Statutory Policy and Whistleblowing Research
One of the fundamental policy justifications underlying
whistleblowing statutes and common law claims is the need to disclose
wrongdoing in order to protect the public. In statutes involving
government whistleblowers, this is seen in the text of the law, which
focuses on the need to protect the public purse against improper use of
funds.110 This justification finds its genesis as far back as the False
Claims Act, which sought to limit the fraud being perpetrated by
contractors against the federal government. The need to have employeewhistleblowers uncover this misuse of government funds lies in the
nature of the wrongdoing. It is hidden, a type of corporate white-collar
crime. Unlike the victims of violent crime, the government is unaware
of the wrongdoing most of the time.111 The goals of protecting the
public purse and public safety were highlighted in the Senate Report on
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which states:
Whenever misdeeds take place in a federal agency, there are employees
who know that it has occurred, and who are outraged by it. What is
needed is a means to assure them that they will not suffer if they help
uncover and correct administrative abuses. What is needed is a means to
protect the Pentagon employee who discloses billions of dollars in cost
overruns, the GSA employee who discloses widespread fraud, and the
nuclear engineer who questions the safety of certain nuclear plants.
These conscientious civil servants deserve statutory protection rather than
bureaucratic harassment and intimidation.112

As is evident from this passage, the goals behind whistleblowing
protections also range from protecting public funds to protecting the
public‘s physical safety. A recent example of the focus on physical
safety is seen in the 2007 passage of a law to implement
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.113 Parts of this law focus on

110. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006).
111. See TERANCE D. MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK 28–29 (1999) (discussing the hidden
nature of criminal activity in the modern workplace); Ramirez, supra note 11, at 226 (discussing the
hidden nature of white collar crime as a rationale for creating a blanket federal whistleblower protection
statute).
112. S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2730.
113. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-053.
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increasing the safety of public transportation, and these portions contain
strong whistleblower protection provisions.114
In the private sector, safety concerns were the driving force behind
the beginning of the modern whistleblowing movement. Ralph Nader‘s
consumer safety advocacy in the 1970s is frequently credited as one of
the driving forces behind modern whistleblower protection.115 The
focus of this movement was protecting the public from dangerous
products produced by private companies. This goal of protecting public
interests, as opposed to private interests, is evident in the decisions
limiting whistleblowing claims to situations where there is a public
interest present, not merely a private interest of the disclosing
employee.116
While the need to protect the public purse was an initial rationale for
encouraging whistleblowing in the government, recently, the protections
for whistleblowers in the private sector have extended beyond protecting
physical safety to protecting financial security. For instance, the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created
whistleblower protections for employees who provide information about
violations of securities laws. This act also created a bounty system
allowing these employees to share in a portion of the Securities and
Exchange Commission‘s recovery of funds from the employer.117
Beyond the protection of the public‘s financial and physical safety,
protecting employees who are carrying out job duties when they disclose
wrongdoing also comports with the concept of the rule of law.118
Disclosure of wrongdoing promotes enforcement and compliance with
the law.119
Employees are particularly effective at promoting
compliance because of their placement and ability to detect unlawful
behavior. Outsider inspectors and auditors put companies on alert,
114. Id. at § 1413. For a description of these provisions, see WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note
9, at 3-18 (Supp. 2010).
115. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 10.
116. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
117. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922.
118. See Robert Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 586 (1999).
119. See MIETHE, supra note 111, at 85–86 (discussing importance of whistleblowing provisions
to ensuring compliance with laws).
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allowing the concealment of unlawful conduct. Employees are better
positioned to see the normal conduct of the company. Protecting those
who engage in disclosure encourages such disclosure and thereby
promotes greater compliance by companies with legal requirements.
In addition, whistleblower statutes also embody a policy in favor of
protecting employees‘ other, non-whistleblowing rights.120 In other
words, whistleblowing protection provisions help protect an employee‘s
other substantive rights by ensuring that employees do not have to
choose between losing their jobs and exercising other rights.121
All these policy goals—to protect public money, promote safety,
protect private finances, encourage compliance with the law, and
support individual rights—support strong protections for employeewhistleblowers. The job duties exclusion renders this valuable insider
extremely vulnerable to retaliation for engaging in whistleblowing
behavior. Employees are most likely to have insider information about
employer wrongdoing when that conduct is something that they
encounter on the job. It seems doubtful that most employees are
actively looking outside of their duties for wrongdoing by their
employers. The job duties exclusion forecloses protection in most
instances where the employee‘s job involves investigation and
disclosure of wrongdoing. This means that where employees are likely
to have the most accurate information about wrongdoing, they are least
likely to be protected if they disclose it. The lack of protection for these
employees suggests that less whistleblowing will occur to the detriment
of public safety and public and private financial interests.122
Empirical research on whistleblowing suggests employees whose job
requires disclosure of wrongdoing are particularly well-situated to be
effective whistleblowers. In a study of what makes individuals more
likely to report wrongdoing, one of the key factors affecting
whistleblowing behavior was the role of the employee. 123 Where the

120. See Lobel, supra note 14, at 456–57 (describing the rights-based rationale for whistleblower
protections).
121. Lobel, supra note 14, at 456–57.
122. However, those employees who have an obligation to disclose that is derived from a source
outside of their employment duties, such as an attorney‘s ethical obligations, may still disclose
wrongdoing due to such obligation. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
123. See Janet P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistleblowing Process: Suggestions from Power
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employee‘s role was one in which the employee had some responsibility
for reporting wrongdoing, the employee was more likely to engage in
whistleblowing behavior.124 These individuals were perceived of as
having more credibility when they engaged in whistleblowing, as
compared to employees whose jobs lacked such a role.125 These
employees are most clearly barred from whistleblower protection by the
job duties exclusion because the terms of their job require reporting
wrongdoing.
The exclusion is also unjustifiable because it operates to place greater
weight on the employer‘s interests in controlling its employees than on
the need to disclose illegal behavior. The exclusion, which is not
written into whistleblowing statutes, represents a judicial re-weighing of
the relative interests of the employer, the employee, and the public.
Were the exclusion incorporated into the claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy, it might be justifiable as a part of the
balancing of interests that the judicial branch has undertaken in creating
new substantive legal rights. However, when the exclusion is grafted
onto statutes which lack any language suggesting its existence, its
legitimacy is questionable at best.
What interest of the employer, other than the general interest in
controlling the workplace, might justify the job duties exclusion? One
that has been raised is an employee‘s fiduciary obligations to the
corporation.126 The duty of loyalty requires that the employee act on
behalf of the company and in the best interests of the company. The
obligations imposed on an employee by this duty depend on the
employee‘s position within the company. For example, a CEO is bound
by much tighter constraints than is a janitor. A CEO would be
prohibited from working for a competitor company by the duties of care
and loyalty; a janitor would not.
The practical impact of the job duties exclusion is to foreclose
protection even where, in reality, there is no tension between the goals
Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 393, 398, 402 (1993).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 404.
126. See, e.g., Willis v. Dep‘t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the
employee‘s ―fiduciary obligations‖ to his employer); Sasse v. U.S. Dep‘t of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 780
(6th Cir. 2005); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 28–30.
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of promoting public safety and employee‘s duty of loyalty to the
corporation. The tension between the whistleblowing policy goals of
protecting the public and the employee‘s duty to be loyal to the
company can be obvious in some instances. Where an employee knows
that the company‘s product could be made safer by changes in the
manufacturing or design of the product that would come at a high cost,
does the employee act in the interest of the public (greater safety) or the
interests of the company (cost savings)? Not all situations, however,
exhibit such a tension; what may be in the best interests of the public
(greater safety) may also be in the best interests of the company. For
example, if the product in question could be made safer at a slightly
increased cost, it may be in the interests of the company to change the
design or manufacturing of the product in order to decrease the number
of tort claims brought against it for harms caused by the product. The
savings created by reducing the number of claims may offset or exceed
the costs of making the design changes, manufacturing changes, or
both.127 What does this mean for the job duties exclusion? Given the
goal of producing a safer society, if there is no tension, then there is no
benefit to the job duties exclusion. If it is in the interests of the
company to have the behavior disclosed, then there is no theoretical
justification for allowing retaliation against the employee. At a
minimum, this suggests that the job duties exclusion is unjustified where
the best interests of the company lie in disclosure of the unlawful
conduct.
Other employer interests merit inclusion in the assessment of the job
duties exclusion. First, there is the need to control the workplace and
engage in normal disciplinary practices.128 The concern here appears to
be that if reports made pursuant to one‘s job duties are protected
disclosures, the employee can never be disciplined for making a bad
report. Or, to put it more generally, employers fear that poor performers
will use whistleblower protections as a shield against legitimate
127. This type of situation could arise where there is imperfect information sharing within the
company, such as where key decision makers are not informed of possible alternative designs, costs of
litigation, or the likelihood of litigation.
128. This argument was made by the court in Huffman and is discussed in Part II.A., supra. This
argument was also made by the employer in Kidwell. See Brief and Appendix of Respondent Sybaritic,
Inc., Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010) (No. A07-584), 2008 WL 7967961.
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discipline. Another employer concern relates to jobs involving
compliance with legal standards. Employers fear that any discussion of
compliance will be a protected report: if there is a genuine disagreement
as to whether conduct is lawful, the employee cannot be disciplined for
continuing to raise the issue even if the employer tells the employee to
drop it.129 Thus, this employee becomes disruptive in the workplace.
These are legitimate concerns of the employer. However, the answer
to these concerns is not to exclude all reports made pursuant to an
employee‘s job. First, as to the disciplinary concern, if the employer
engages in discipline due to poor job performance, the disclosure of
wrongdoing does not render the discipline unlawful merely because the
poor performance relates to the discipline.130 The finder of fact would
be responsible for determining whether the true reason for discipline
was a report of wrongdoing or poor performance.131 Second, as to
employees in compliance positions, these are the most crucial persons to
protect in order to ensure whistleblowing continues. Employees in
compliance positions are the ones most likely to see violations of the
law in the company—it is in the nature of their work. Broadly
excluding these employees‘ reports from protection would greatly
undermine efforts at disclosing unlawful employer conduct. However,
courts need not give carte blanche to these employees in the manner and
the nature of their reports. For instance, the employee who keeps
pressing his concerns after the employer has attempted to address them
can lose protection by being unduly disruptive in reporting alleged
wrongdoing.132 Legitimate employer concerns can be addressed using
existing doctrines that are more narrowly tailored to meet these concerns
129. See, e.g., Haddox v. Att‘y Gen., NO. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077 (Oh. Ct. App. Aug. 26,
2008) (discussing the compliance position situation).
130. Most courts allow the employer to avoid liability by proving that the employer would have
taken the same action even if the employee had not engaged in the whistleblowing behavior. See
WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 234–35, 239–40 (noting that whistleblowing claims typically
borrow Title VII burdens of proof); see also Suggs v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 415 F. App‘x 240 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (affirming decision that employer‘s discipline of poor performing employee was proper
despite employee‘s assertion that it was retaliation for engaging in whistleblowing).
131. See, e.g., Ivey v. Department of the Treasury, 107 F. App‘x 918 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (containing
factual allegations of poor performance by employer versus whistleblowing activity by the employee).
132. See, e.g., Dunham v. Brock, 794 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1986); see also WESTMAN &
MODESITT, supra note 9, at 236–37 (discussing potential employer defenses involving disruptive
employees).
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than is the job duties exclusion. The job duties exclusion replaces these
fact-specific approaches with a broad exclusion, favoring interests of
employers over the interests of the public and of the employee
disclosing wrongdoing.
B. Internal vs. External Reporting and the Job Duties Exclusion
The job duties exclusion incentivizes external reporting by
foreclosing protections for reports made to one‘s supervisor pursuant to
one‘s job. Under the job duties exclusion, there are only two situations
in which a person whose job involves the investigation and/or disclosure
of wrongdoing is protected: (1) where the disclosure is made outside of
normal reporting channels and (2) where the disclosure is not one that is
normally a part of the job.133 The simplest way to avoid the job duties
exclusion is to report wrongdoing to an outside entity. Making a
disclosure to the press, for example, will generally not be a disclosure in
the normal channel or a disclosure that the employee is normally
required to make, placing it within both exceptions to the job duties
exclusion.
One might believe that because external disclosures are likely to
remain protected even under the job duties exclusion, the exclusion will
not have a significant negative impact on whistleblowing behavior.
There are two flaws with this belief. First, most whistleblowers do not
use external channels to report wrongdoing.
In a study of
whistleblowers, only 30% indicated that they would report wrongdoing
externally.134 The author of the study, Terance Miethe, posits that one
of the reasons for this is the social conditioning not to air private dirty
laundry in public.135 Furthermore, in some instances internal reporting
is not mere social conditioning: it is required. For instance, if an
employee wants to obtain monetary relief under Title VII for reporting
certain types of unlawful harassment on the job, the employee must
report the harassment to the employer internally, use the company‘s
normal reporting procedures, and give the company the opportunity to

133. See Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d. 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
134. MIETHE, supra note 111, at 64.
135. Id.
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take corrective action and stop the harassment.136 In addition, reporting
externally may lead to the employee breaching confidentiality
requirements and, ultimately, may result in the employee losing the
These types of legal
protection of whistleblowing statutes.137
requirements strengthen the sense of employees that one should first
report internally. The job duties exclusion penalizes the employee who
does what he is socially and legally conditioned to do.
In addition, excluding internal reporting from protected behavior
helps create a workplace where the culture discourages whistleblowing.
Where employees receive the message that internal disclosures are not
welcome, a belief that no disclosures should be made, either internally
or externally, is fostered. This leads to the development of a company
that has fewer overall disclosures of wrongdoing.138
Furthermore, a disclosure to outsiders rather than insiders is typically
not the ideal way to address wrongdoing. First, it is contrary to the duty
of loyalty. The duty of loyalty requires an employee to act in the best
interests of the employer. When faced with disclosing wrongdoing to
the company itself or disclosing it externally, it would be better for the
company to have a chance to correct the problem internally before the
wrongdoing becomes known to outsiders.139 In addition, putting to one
side duty of loyalty considerations, external reporting is likely to be
either disruptive to an organization or ineffective. 140 If the person
receiving the report of wrongdoing does nothing, the report is
ineffective. If the person receiving the report acts on it, disruption
ensues for a number of reasons. First, the employer will not be
receiving the information through its normal channels. Those best
equipped to address the wrongdoing may be placed in a defensive
position, reacting to outside pressure rather than conducting a more
neutral investigation. This is particularly possible if, as is the case in

136. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (establishing an affirmative
defense for employers to certain Title VII claims).
137. For instance, under SOX, the disclosure of confidential information externally resulted in the
employee losing his whistleblowing claim. See Tides v. Boeing Co., 644 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2011).
138. See MIETHE, supra note 111, at 64 (discussing how corporate culture can affect rates of
whistleblowing behavior).
139. See Near et al., supra note 123, at 395.
140. See Vaughn, supra note 118, at 599 (discussing the potential for disruption).
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most larger organizations today, the entity has personnel and channels
devoted to handling such reports. For instance, most employers have
created mechanisms for reporting violations of Title VII, particularly
instances of sexual harassment. A report to an external entity may not
trigger the normal investigative process. For instance, newspaper
reports of harassment may trigger a response at a higher corporate level
and involve those who are not normally a part of such investigations,
tainting the result and removing those individuals from their daily
duties.
Additional empirical support for the perverse results of the job duties
exclusion is found in a recent study of whistleblowers and what legal
structures were the best at maximizing reporting of wrongdoing. 141
Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel concluded that imposing a duty to report
wrongdoing can increase rates of whistleblowing. If a duty to report
increases whistleblowing behavior and suggests that those whose jobs
involve a required report (making it a duty) are more likely to engage in
whistleblowing behavior. The job duties exclusion places employees
into a bind, where they owe an obligation to report but are not protected
when they do so. The exclusion also creates potential for employer
abuse. Specifically, by drafting employees‘ job descriptions to include a
duty to report unlawful conduct, the employer limits the likelihood of
employees‘ reports being protected by whistleblowing statutes.
In addition, the job duties exclusion also has the potential to bar
another likely group of whistleblowers: those who know the appropriate
channels within an organization to report wrongdoing. 142 Research has
indicated that whistleblowing is more likely to occur among employees
who are aware of the proper reporting channels and procedures.143
Those who report within appropriate channels are unlikely to be
protected due to the job duties exclusion. This may push individuals to
report wrongdoing outside of the organization. The unfortunate result of
this is likely to be greater retaliation against the employee, as there is
also evidence that external whistleblowers are more likely to be

141. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151 (2010).
142. Near et al., supra note 123 at 398.
143. Id. at 398.
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retaliated against than those who report internally. 144
On the other hand, there are some benefits to external reporting.
First, it has the potential to bring unlawful behavior to the attention of
law enforcement more quickly, before the company can engage in a
cover-up. However, the determination of whether external or internal
reporting is to be preferred has already been made by legislatures in
crafting whistleblower protection statutes. As noted above, some
statutes require internal reporting, while others require reporting to
external entities.145 The fact that such variations exist illustrates the
legislative choices that are incorporated into the whistleblower statutes.
The judicially created job duties exclusion ignores this legislative
preference.
A second justification for requiring external reporting is that it creates
a bright-line rule that is easy for courts to administer. Indeed, the ease
of judicial administration is a potential justification for the entirety of
the job duties exclusion, not just the aspect of it that encourages external
reporting. After all, an inquiry into the parameters of an employee‘s job
is eminently susceptible to resolution without a trial, as there are
relatively few facts at issue. The entire debate over whether the
employee was subject to negative treatment, and if so, why it occurred,
can be sidestepped if the report was within the employee‘s job duties.
Even so, the ease of judicial administration is an insufficient
justification for a doctrine that effectively erases statutory protections
for some whistleblowers.
IV. INFECTING THE STATES AND OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES
The job duties exclusion has existed for over a decade. During much
of that time, it remained solely applicable to the WPA. It has only been
since Garcetti146 that the job duties exclusion has shown signs of
144. MARCIA MICELI ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS 115 (2008).
145. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-26A-1 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-531 (2010).
146. The notable exception to this is the Sasse decision applying the job duties exclusion to three
federal environmental statutes. Sasse v. U.S. Dep‘t of Labor, 409 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 2005). However,
this seems to be a unique case, as it involved a federal employee seeking whisteblower protection; as
noted above, this put the attorneys in the case in the position of being aware of Willis, and Huffman. It
is highly unlikely that the job duties exclusion would show the signs it is currently showing of becoming
generally applicable based solely on Sasse; the publicity surrounding Garcetti popularized the concept.
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beginning to expand its reach to state statutes, as will be discussed in
detail below. Before discussing the expansion of the job duties
exclusion, it is necessary to first understand Garcetti itself and its effect
on the whistleblower protections available to governmental employees.
A. Garcetti as a Whistleblower Case
As noted above, there has been much scholarly analysis of Garcetti v.
Ceballos,147 most of it negative in nature.148 This Article will consider
Garcetti from a different perspective than much of the existing
scholarship. To date, many of the analyses of Garcetti assess it from the
perspective of First Amendment doctrine as applied to governmental
employees.149 This is the obvious context in which to assess Garcetti.
However, there is another context in which Garcetti exists as well: the
web of protections for governmental employee whistleblowers.
The plaintiff in Garcetti was a district attorney in California. Defense
counsel contacted him and expressed concern about certain aspects of a
specific case, particularly a warrant that had produced evidence leading
to an indictment of defense counsel‘s client. Ceballos investigated the
situation, which was something ―not unusual‖ for a district attorney in
his position as a calendar deputy officer to do.150 The district attorney
reported to his supervisors his belief that a warrant contained serious
factual misrepresentations and that the indictment it produced should be
dismissed. Ceballos‘s recommendation led to a meeting that included
Ceballos, his supervisors, and the sheriff‘s officers who had been
involved in the case. The meeting was heated and, ultimately,
Ceballos‘s recommendations were rejected. Ceballos brought suit,
alleging violations of his First Amendment rights because he allegedly

147. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
148. See supra note 5.
149. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983:
A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008); Andrew Bernie, A Principled
Limitation on Judicial Interference: Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1047 (2007); Stephen Safstrom, Government Employee, Are You a “Citizen”?: Garcetti v.
Ceballos and the “Citizenship” Prong to the Pickering/Connick Protected Speech Test, 52 St. LOUIS U.
L.J. 589, pt. I (2008).
150. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.
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suffered retaliation after the contentious meeting.151
Ceballos‘ employer argued that because Ceballos had been speaking
in the meeting as an employee, not a citizen, his speech was not
protected under the First Amendment.152 The Supreme Court agreed,
holding that ―when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.‖153
Garcetti has been much discussed and much criticized. Within this
discussion, there has been some analysis of Garcetti‘s implications for
whistleblowers.154 However, less attention has been paid to Garcetti‘s
role in acting as the final nail in the coffin of the federal employee who
discloses wrongdoing as part of his job.155 While the employee in
Garcetti was a state attorney, the same situation could easily present
itself to a federal attorney. The WPA does not protect the federal
employee who informs his supervisors of wrongdoing—a potentially
illegal search—because his report is part of his job duties. He is not
covered by the exceptions to Huffman because he made the report to his
supervisor within his chain of command, and this type of report is one
that a federal employee is normally expected to make in performing his
job. Nor is he protected by the First Amendment due to Garcetti.
Scholars have failed to note the fascinating adoption of a doctrine that
appears to be derived from Huffman, without discussion or attribution,
into First Amendment jurisprudence. Certainly the Supreme Court must
have been aware of the job duties exclusion applicable to WPA claims.
It was brought to the Court‘s attention in several of the many amici
briefs filed in Garcetti.156 The Government Accountability Project
151. Id. at 414–15.
152. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–14, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04473), 2004 WL 2260964.
153. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
154. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 14, at 451–55; Amanda Leiter, “Whistle . . . and You’ve Got an
Audience,” 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 747, 765–66 (2009); John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation after
Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 562–63 (2007).
155. Lobel, supra note 14, at 453 (addressing, albeit briefly, the issue of a federal employee
disclosing wrongdoing as part of his job).
156. Brief of Amici Curiae Gov‘t Accountability Project, Nat‘l Emp‘t Lawyers Ass‘n and Ass‘n
of Trial Lawyers of Am. in Support of Respondent at 6, 22, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
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(GAP), together with the National Employment Lawyers Association
and the American Trial Lawyers Association, filed a brief that explained
how the WPA‘s job duties exclusion would bar a statutory claim for a
federal employee. The brief noted that, ―the [WPA] no longer covers
speech that is part of carrying out assigned duties, except if the results
are taken outside channels.‖157 The brief cited both Willis and Huffman
in support of this proposition.
The National Treasury Employees Union also brought the job duties
exclusion to the Court‘s attention, noting, ―Courts have denied er
protection to employees who are performing their normally assigned
duties in reporting waste, fraud and abuse.‖158 The brief then cited
Sasse, Huffman, and Willis in support of this proposition. The United
States‘ amicus brief in Garcetti also mentioned Huffman but
downplayed its significance.159 The United States was supporting the
state government‘s position in Garcetti, seeking to limit the employee‘s
First Amendment rights. Its reference to Huffman focused on the fact
that under some circumstances, an employee could still be protected for
reports made in the workplace.160 This discrepancy in the descriptions
of Huffman161 contained in the briefs should have at least triggered some
inquiry into the contours of the Huffman holding, which would lead the
Court to an understanding of the limited statutory protections for federal
employees.
The Supreme Court‘s awareness of the job duties exclusion is also
evident from the fact that one of the dissenting opinions discusses the
problem created by Garcetti and the pre-existing job duties exclusion.
Justice Souter‘s dissent expressly acknowledged the lack of protection
under the WPA for federal employees‘ statements made in connection
(No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1767695.
157. Id. at 22 (citing Willis v. Dep‘t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Huffman v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
158. See Brief for the Nat‘l Treasury Emps. Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
19, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1749167.
159. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27, Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1276045.
160. Id.
161. Another brief brought to the Court‘s attention the somewhat disingenuous description of
Huffman provided by the United States. See Brief of Elaine Mittleman as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2006 WL 730744.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

33

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

194

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

with their normal job duties, stating that, ―significantly, federal
employees have been held to be unprotected for statements made in
connection with normal employment duties . . . the very speech that the
majority says will be covered by ‗the powerful network of legislative
enactments‘ . . . available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.‖162
Justice Souter also cited both Willis and Huffman in his dissent. Despite
this, the majority opinion in Garcetti failed to discuss or even
acknowledge that the job duties exclusion it adopted had its genesis
elsewhere.
In Garcetti, the Court assessed behavior that can be seen as
whistleblowing—the report of an improper warrant—only from a First
Amendment perspective. The Court did not consider whether the job
duties exclusion it articulated would be appropriate as applied to a claim
brought under a whistleblower protection statute. Whether the job
duties exclusion should be applied to a particular whistleblower
protection statute is a vastly different analysis than determining whether
it applies to a First Amendment claim. This is primarily because of the
divergent sources of these protections. On the one hand, the very idea
that a governmental employee‘s speech on the job may be protected
under the First Amendment is a doctrine developed by the Supreme
Court.163 The test developed by the Supreme Court, even at the outset,
was one that required the courts to balance employer interests against
employee interests.164 As the Court noted in Pickering v. Board of
Education,165 ―the problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.‖166 A doctrine that directs the courts on how to engage in
that balancing under certain circumstances is, on some level, consistent
with this balancing concept of the First Amendment. On the other hand,
for whistleblower protection statutes, courts are not directed to balance
the employer and employee interests—the balancing has already been
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) (citations omitted).
See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
Id.
Id. at 568.
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done by the legislature in drafting the statute. Despite the fact that these
are fundamentally different types of analysis, the imprimatur of
Supreme Court approval of the job duties exclusion concept appears to
have provided an unanticipated boost to the viability of the doctrine as
applied to statutory whistleblower claims. This is discussed in the
following subparts.
B. The Garcetti Virus: Preparing Courts to Accept the Huffman Job
Duties Exclusion
Before analyzing the degree to which the job duties exclusion has
infected state statutes, it is helpful to understand the manner in which
this infection has been occurring. Before Garcetti, the job duties
exclusion existed almost in a vacuum because it applied in such a
limited context—to federal employees.167 This would have made it
known primarily to attorneys handling federal employee whistleblowing
claims, not to employment lawyers handling whistleblowing issues in
the private sector. Garcetti seems to have popularized the job duties
exclusion, making the concept known more generally to attorneys and
judges. Of these groups, the driving force behind the increasing number
of courts accepting the job duties exclusion appears to be employers‘
attorneys. They have argued for its application in most whistleblowing
cases,168 with some success.
This is not to suggest that courts have unquestioningly accepted the
job duties exclusion. The difficulty that attorneys have faced in arguing
for the job duties exception has been that Garcetti‘s adoption of the job
duties exclusion took place under the First Amendment. While there are
a few state statutes that mirror the First Amendment, making the
application of Garcetti immediately apparent,169 the holding cannot
simply be applied to most statutory claims. The First Amendment
analysis, with its focus on the topic of the speech and the balancing test

167. While Sasse could be applied to private sector employees, it had not been.
168. As one plaintiff‘s lawyer stated, ―Employers always argue for it [the job duties exclusion] to
apply.‖ Telephone interview with Jason Zuckerman, Senior Legal Advisor, U.S. Office of Special
Counsel (July 2, 2010).
169. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2010).
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of governmental and employee interests,170 is entirely different from an
analysis of the precise terms of a specific federal or state statute that
would be necessary to determine whether the job duties exclusion
should apply. However, the Supreme Court‘s acceptance of the job
duties exclusion in one context (pursuant to the First Amendment)
appears to have given indirect support for the job duties exclusion to be
applied to state statutory whistleblower claims.171
In addition to validating the concept of the job duties exclusion, albeit
in a different context, Garcetti indirectly provided assistance to
attorneys in transferring its holding to whistleblowing statutes. In his
dissent, Justice Souter commented on the effect of Garcetti for federal
employees and discussed Huffman and Willis. Once attorneys were
aware of Huffman and Willis, the argument became simple: generalized
state whistleblowing statutes should be interpreted consistent with the
WPA, using Huffman and Willis as a guide.
One of the significant flaws with this argument is that whistleblowing
statutes vary, making adoption of an interpretation of the WPA subject
to the similarities in language in the statutes. Of particular importance
here is the variance in statutes in identifying the person to whom reports
of wrongdoing must be made in order for statutory protections to apply
to the employee. Some of these provisions are entirely incompatible
with the job duties exclusion, while others render the job duties
exclusion unnecessary. For instance, New York‘s whistleblower
protection statute affirmatively requires that employees report
wrongdoing to their supervisors and provide the employer with an
opportunity to correct the alleged wrongdoing in order to be
protected.172 In other states, employees are required to report to
appropriate enforcement authorities, making the job duties exclusion
effectively unnecessary.173 These varying statutory provisions are
indicative of the fact that state statutory whistleblower protections
embody a legislative balancing of employer interests versus employee
170. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
171. To continue with the infection analogy, Garcetti is the virus that invades the host-court and
makes it more amenable to accepting the Huffman job duties exclusion.
172. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 740 (McKinney 2006).
173. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-9-171 (West 2010) (requiring reports of government
employees be made to a state investigative body).
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and public interests. Thus, courts should not simply apply Huffman and
Willis without considering the precise language of the state statute at
issue.
Despite this, it appears that something, most likely Garcetti‘s holding,
is overriding the normal process of statutory interpretation. The fact that
the Supreme Court‘s adoption of the job duties exclusion occurred in the
context of the First Amendment is likely overshadowed by the fact that
the Supreme Court accepted the concept of the job duties exclusion.
Because of this, Garcetti‘s acceptance of the job duties exclusionary
concept has prepared courts to accept these arguments.
C. Increasing Employer Use and Court Acceptance of the Job Duties
Exclusion
Since Garcetti, employers‘ have, apparently, increasingly attempted
to rely on the job duties exclusion to defeat a whistleblowing claim
based on state statutory protections. Before Garcetti, there were only a
few such reported cases.174 Since then, this number has more than
tripled.175
174. A search of Westlaw revealed four such instances of employers relying on Huffman as a
guide to interpreting a state statute in the five years between Huffman and Garcetti. During this
timeframe there were also two jurisdictions whose courts had addressed the concept of the job duties
exclusion without reference to Huffman. See Colores v. Bd. of Trs., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003); Erickson v. City of Orr, No. A05-481, 2005 WL 2277395, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 20,
2005); Andrews v. Northwestern Travel Servs., No. C5-97-1766, 1998 WL 100608, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 10, 1998); Gee v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005);
Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass'n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Minn. 2005). In neither jurisdiction did the courts
adopt a broad job duties exclusion. In Colores, the California Court of Appeals refused to apply any
exclusion at all. In Minnesota, the courts developed a requirement that an individual whose job required
reporting wrongdoing prove that his intent was to expose wrongdoing, not merely to fulfill the
employee‘s job duties. There have also been less-successful attempts to apply the job duties exclusion
to the anti-retaliation provisions of federal, topic-specific statutes, using Sasse as the guide and basis for
the argument. See Defendant‘s Motion for Directed Verdict, Mather v. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety, No.
04-1476 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 12, 2006), 2006 WL 3495504; Opposition to Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint, Cates v. State, No. GIC 809037 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2004), 2004 WL
5651460; Dunleavy v. Wayne Cnty. Comm‘n, No. 04-74670-CL, 2005 WL 2545740 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
12, 2005); Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
175. The following are cases in which the Huffman job duties exclusion was raised: Lehmann v.
Conn. Legal Rights Project, Inc., No. CV054018378, 2007 WL 1053941, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
27, 2007); Defendant‘s Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Nobles v. Indus.
Powder Coatings, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-311 (E.D. Tenn. July 3, 2007), 2007 WL 4834450; Haddox v.
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Furthermore, none of the four cases relying on Huffman that predated
Garcetti explicitly adopted the job duties exclusion. In Mather v.
Executive Office for Public Safety, the defendant made the argument in a
motion for a directed verdict, which was denied.176 In Cates v. State, the
defendant asserted the job duties exclusion in the trial court as part of its
opposition to the Plaintiff‘s Motion for Leave to Amend,177 but that
court ultimately decided the issue on other grounds.178 The court in
Dunleavy v. Wayne County Commission dismissed the state statutory
whistleblower claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as part of its
decision dismissing a federal claim without addressing the defendant‘s
proffered argument on the job duties exclusion.179
In only one of these cases before Garcetti did the court expressly
address the applicability of the Huffman job duties exclusion to a state
Att‘y Gen., No. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008); Defendants‘ Motion in
Limine, Clifford v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-0682 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2008), 2008 WL
6858342; Petition for Review, Vera v. Sun Land Beef Co., No. CV-09-0085-PR (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009),
2009 WL 2335091; Defendant‘s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Prendergast v.
Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings, L.L.C., No. CV 07-01265 (D. N. Mex. June 15, 2009), 2009
WL 2817454; Plaintiff‘s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Hess v. Borough of Blairsville, No.
209-CV-00935 (W.D. Penn. Aug. 20, 2009), 2009 WL 3212944; Brief for the Defendants-Appellees,
Malone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09-2060 (1st Cir. Nov. 10, 2009), 2009 WL 6809429; Kidwell v.
Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010); Defendants‘ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, Barker v. UBS AG & UBS Sec., L.L.C., No. 3:09-CV-02084 (D. Conn.
Jan. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 1228029; Trusz v. USB Realty Investors, L.L.C., No. 309-cv-268, 2010 WL
1287148, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2010); Appellant‘s Opening Brief, Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Comm.
Coll. Dist., No. CV-073384 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010), 2010 WL 3481775; Gammon v. Crisis &
Counseling Cntrs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D. Me. 2011). Not all these cases resulted in a court
decision addressing the job duties exclusion. Five jurisdictions—California, Connecticut, Ohio,
Louisiana, and Minnesota—have addressed the job duties exclusion.
176. See Defendant‘s Motion for Directed Verdict, Mather v. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety, No. 041476 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 12, 2006), 2006 WL 3495504 (articulating Huffman argument); Special
Verdict, Mather v. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety, No. 04-1476 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 16, 2006), 2006 WL
2158974 (indicating that directed verdict was denied as the case ultimately went to the jury).
177. See Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, Cates v. State, No. GIC
809037 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2004), 2004 WL 5651460 (arguing for Huffman as a basis for denying
leave to amend complaint); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant DGC‘s
Motion for Attorneys‘ Fees, Cates v. State, No. GIC 809037 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 25, 2005), 2005 WL
6226000 (noting that whistleblowing claim was dismissed but not specifying basis for decision).
178. See Cates v. Div. of Gambling & Control, No. D. 046874, 2007 WL 702229, at *11 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 8, 2007).
179. See Opinion and Order of Dismissal, Dunleavy v. Wayne Cnty. Comm‘n, No. 04-cv-74670
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2009), 2006 WL 2375679.
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statutory whistleblower claim. In 2002, the Texas Court of Appeals
declined to adopt the job duties exclusion in Rogers v. City of Fort
Worth.180 Rogers involved a deputy sheriff who was allegedly fired for
writing a report which contained information about a co-worker‘s
conduct that violated a city ordinance.181 The defending employer
argued that the Huffman job duties exclusion applied, apparently
because the employee had written the report at his supervisor‘s
request.182 The Court articulated two reasons for its refusal to follow
Huffman. First, the Court noted that the Huffman rationale for the
adoption of the job duties exclusion was based on its legislative history,
which the Huffman court described as limiting the goal of the WPA to
protecting employees who go above and beyond the call of duty. 183 The
Rogers court found no similar legislative history in the Texas
whistleblower protection statute and determined that even though the
Texas statute was generally modeled after the WPA, this was
insufficient to justify the adoption of the Huffman approach.184 Second,
the Rogers court indicated that the Huffman job duties exclusion was
inconsistent with Texas precedent and suggested that the terms of the
statute lacked any language that would justify the exclusion.185
Since Garcetti, there has been an increase in the incidence of
employers relying on the job duties exclusion.186 In addition, there are
indications that courts are more willing to accept the job duties
exclusion. While the majority of the post-Garcetti cases have resulted
in no direct discussion of the job duties exclusion, four jurisdictions
since Garcetti have accepted the job duties exclusion, and one
jurisdiction appears to have accepted the job duties exclusion in part,
applying it to public employees but not private employees. Only one
jurisdiction has refused to apply the job duties exclusion at all. In sum,
what appeared to be a losing argument pre-Garcetti is now viable.

180. See Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
181. Id. at 271–74.
182. See id. at 276 (declining to apply Huffman).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Of the thirteen cases where the Huffman job duties exclusion has been raised, only the seven
cases discussed below appear to have resulted in a decision on whether to apply it.
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Minnesota provides insight into how Garcetti has indirectly
influenced courts to accept the job duties exclusion. Minnesota had
grappled with the issue of whether disclosures made as a part of an
employee‘s job were protected under the Minnesota Whistleblower
Protection Act before Garcetti.187 While pre-Garcetti cases interpreting
the Minnesota Act did discuss an employee‘s job duties, the primary
focus was on the statute‘s ―good faith‖ requirement. The good faith
requirement provides that, in order to be protected, an employee‘s
disclosure must be made in good faith. 188 This term was defined to
provide protection only to disclosures made for the purpose of exposing
illegality.189 Thus, the inquiry was whether the disclosure was made
with the purpose of exposing illegality or simply done because the
employee‘s job required it. These Minnesota cases did not cite to Willis,
Huffman, or Sasse.190
After Garcetti, it still took some time before Huffman and Willis
intruded into Minnesota‘s analysis. In 2008, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals addressed the job duties issue in Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc.,191
yet none of the briefs mentioned Garcetti, Huffman, Willis, or Sasse,192
and the court‘s decision followed the Minnesota analysis described

187. See, e.g., Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass‘n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Minn. 2005) (explaining that
the Minnesota Act protects employees in the public and private sectors).
188. See, e.g., Gee v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 555–56 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005) (focusing on ―good faith‖ and intent to expose illegality in assessing whether employee
performing job engaged in protected activity); Erickson v. City of Orr, No. A05-481, 2005 WL
2277395, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2005) (noting that intent must be to expose illegal behavior);
Freeman, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–41 (discussing the ―good faith‖ requirement and concluding that
merely performing one‘s job is insufficient to establish the requisite good faith). While the good faith
requirement is the primary mode of analysis, some cases do exist where the court fails to analyze the
issue in depth and cursorily concludes that the report was made not to expose illegality but to perform
one‘s job. See, e.g., Andrews v. Northwestern Travel Servs., Inc., No. C5-97-1766, 1998 WL 100608
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1998) (discussing job duties without focusing on good faith or intent in
making report).
189. See Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000).
190. See Gee, 700 N.W.2d at 555–56; Erickson, 2005 WL 2277395, at *7; Freeman, 404 F. Supp.
2d at 1139–41.
191. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
192. See Gee v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 555–56 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005);
Erickson v. City of Orr, No. A05-481, 2005 WL 2277395 at *7 (Minn. App. 2005); Freeman, 404 F.
Supp. 2d at 1139–41.
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above.193 By the time that Kidwell made it to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, however, Huffman, Willis, and Garcetti were heavily cited in the
parties‘ briefs,194 and Huffman went on to take center stage in the court‘s
analysis.
Kidwell195 serves as an example of the extent to which Garcetti is
affecting the state court interpretations of state whistleblowing statutes.
Minnesota had a decade of decisions that focused on good faith in
assessing whether a disclosure was protected.196 Despite this, the
Minnesota Supreme Court took a radically different approach in
Kidwell; one that, in effect, adopted the Huffman job duties exclusion.
While the court explicitly stated that it was not adopting a blanket rule
that ―as a matter of law, ‗an employee does not engage in protected
conduct under the whistleblower act if the employee makes a report in
fulfillment of the duties of his or her job,‘‖197 it effectively replaced its
good faith test with the Huffman job duties exclusion.
In order to reach this result, the court first determined that it was
appropriate and helpful to consider cases interpreting the WPA, ignoring
the fact that the WPA and Minnesota statute‘s language differs. 198 The
court then suggested that it was combining the traditional Minnesota
analysis, described above, with the Huffman approach when it decided
193. The Court of Appeals appeared to go one step further than earlier cases, though, when it
stated that employees are not protected under the state whisteblower statute if the report of illegality is
done pursuant to their job duties. This seemed to suggest that the case-by-case assessment of the
employee‘s good faith intent was being replaced with an absolute bar. See Kidwell, 749 N.W.2d at 857.
194. In Kidwell, the employee, did not cite any of these sources in his initial brief. See Brief and
Appendix of Appellant Brian Kidwell, Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010) (No.
A07-584), 2008 WL 7967955. However, his employer relied on all of these cases in its initial brief. See
Brief and Appendix of Respondent Sybaritic, Inc., Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn.
2010) (No. A07-584), 2008 WL 7967961, at *24–25, *27. Kidwell‘s subsequent brief addressed these
cases as well. Reply Brief of Appellant Brian Kidwell, Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220
(Minn. 2010) (No. A07-584), 2008 WL 7967964, at *1–2, *6–7.
195. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010).
196. See Erickson v. City of Orr, No. A05-481, 2005 WL 2277395, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept.
20, 2005); Andrews v. Northwestern Travel Servs., No. C5-97-1766, 1998 WL 100608, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 10, 1998); Gee v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005);
Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass'n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Minn. 2005).
197. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 226–27.
198. The dissent in Kidwell notes that drawing on interpretations of the WPA is inappropriate
because there are textual distinctions between the two statutes. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d 220, 236
(Minn. 2010) (Anderson, J., dissenting).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

41

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4

202

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

that where the employee‘s report of wrongdoing is made pursuant to the
employee‘s job duties, the employee will need to show ―something
more‖ in order to prove that the report was made with the intent to blow
the whistle. This appears to do little to change existing Minnesota law.
However, the court then went on to analyze the question of what
―something more‖ would be by explicitly approving Huffman‘s
exceptions to the job duties exclusion.199 First, the court adopted the
Huffman exception that protects reports made outside of the normal
reporting structure.200 Second, the court adopted the Huffman exception
that protects reports where the employee is generally required to report
wrongful behavior (as would be the case where a statute or regulation
requires the reporting), but the requirement is not a specifically assigned
duty.201
The result of this marriage of existing Minnesota doctrine and the job
duties exclusion is, at the end of the day, likely to become simply the job
duties exclusion. This is evident by the manner in which the court
applied its announced rules. Rather than a general assessment of the
employee‘s intent, the court determined that the employee‘s report was
not protected because neither of the two Huffman exceptions applied and
specifically noted that ―this case falls within the first situation described
above in Huffman, where an employee, with a specific assignment for
ensuring legal compliance, discovers and reports a potential problem to
his client.‖202 Minnesota has become infected with the job duties
exclusion.203 Moreover, this marks a significant doctrinal shift because
the exclusion will now be applied to public and private sector
employees‘ whistleblowing claims.204

199. Id. at 228–29 (majority opinion).
200. Id. at 229–30.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 230.
203. Once adopted, the job duties exclusion seems to become a driving force in much
whistleblowing litigation. For example, since Huffman was decided, the job duties exclusion has been
relied upon in hundreds of cases involving the WPA. This can be seen by Key Citing Huffman and then
limiting the display to those cases relying upon the headnotes addressing the job duties exclusion. Since
these are only the cases that end up being reported by Westlaw, it is fair to assume there are a significant
number of cases dismissed early on based on the job duties exclusion that do not end up reported.
204. Kidwell involved a private sector employee. The Minnesota statute covers both public and
private sector employees. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.931 (West 2010).
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The second, and perhaps most enthusiastic, acceptance of the job
duties exclusion since Garcetti is seen in Haddox v. Ohio Attorney
General,205 a decision by the Ohio Court of Appeals. Haddox involved
a state attorney who alleged that she had been demoted because she
reported a subordinate for misreporting her time, resulting in an accrual
of compensatory time to which the subordinate employee was not
entitled.206 The court noted a scarcity of authority interpreting the Ohio
whistleblowing statute, and therefore turned to Willis and Huffman for
guidance. The court quoted extensively from Willis and Huffman,207
then noted that ―we find the reasoning of the federal courts equally
applicable to [the Ohio statute] . . . .‖208
The Haddox court did not, however, take the initial step of
considering whether the language of the statutes is sufficiently similar to
justify following Huffman. In fact, there are differences between the
statutes. For instance, the WPA does not delineate to whom protected
disclosures must be made; however, Ohio‘s statute does by specifically
identifying supervisors as those to whom reports may be made.209 This
specific inclusion of reports made to supervisors within the protection of
the statute undercuts part of Huffman‘s rationale—that Congress could
not have intended to cover disclosures to supervisors because that would
encompass too many workplace disputes. As a matter of statutory
analysis, Haddox is less than compelling.
What appeared to be driving the decision in Haddox was the court‘s
concern about the potential number of whistleblowing claims that could
be brought without having a limitation like the job duties exclusion.210
205. Haddox v. Att‘y Gen., No. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008).
206. Id. at *6–7.
207. The court also mentioned a third case, Anderson v. Dep‘t of Energy, 89 Fed. App‘x 711
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam), which applied Huffman and cited to Sasse and Skare v. Extendicare
Health Servs., Inc., 515 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying Minnesota law in a federal case).
208. Haddox, 2008 WL 3918077, at *9.
209. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.341(A) (West 2010).
Another example of differences between the statutes is that the WPA protects ―disclosures‖, while the
Ohio statute protects only written ―reports‖. While this particular language may not affect the adoption
of the job duties exclusion, it illustrates how differently the statutes are written, which suggests that
wholesale adoption in Ohio of a judicially-created exception to the WPA should be viewed skeptically.
210. See Haddox v. Att‘y Gen., No. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26,
2008) (expressing concern that accepting the employee‘s argument would open the door to every
supervisory report being the basis for a whistleblowing claim).
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As discussed in Part II.A., supra, this concern can be addressed in a far
more focused manner than by categorically excluding all reports made
pursuant to one‘s job.
Another flaw in the Haddox court‘s analysis was its second rationale
for adopting the job duties exclusion. Looking beyond Huffman and its
progeny, the Haddox court found support for its decision in the
Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Kidwell v. Sybaritic.211 The
problem with this approach, however, is that the Minnesota statute
contains a good faith requirement that serves as the statutory basis for
the Kidwell version of the job duties exclusion;212 such a requirement is
not necessary under the Ohio statute.213
The third example of adoption of the job duties exclusion is seen in
the state of Louisiana, and the decision shows a lack of analysis far
greater than that in Haddox. In Matthews v. Military Dep’t of the State
of Louisiana,214 the Louisiana Court of Appeals determined, without
discussion of the facts or law, that the job duties exclusion applied to a
whistleblower provision in Louisiana‘s environmental protection
statute.215 Rather than relying on Huffman, the court used Sasse to
support its decision. Even so, since Sasse relied on Huffman as support
for its adoption of the job duties exclusion, Matthews ultimately rests
upon Huffman. Much like Haddox, though, the court failed to assess the
language of the whistleblower protection provision in the Louisiana
statute and whether the language was sufficiently similar to that in the
environmental protection statutes at issue in Sasse.216 The court‘s
summary conclusion in Matthews was followed in a later case, Stone v.
Entergy Services, Inc.,217 also without any analysis of the rationale for

211. Id. at 10.
212. Id.
213. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.341(A) (West 2010).
214. Matthews v. Military Dep‘t, 970 So. 2d 1089 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
215. Id. at 1090.
216. Id. The entire discussion of the job duties exclusion and Sasse consists of the following
statement: ―We also find that plaintiff is afforded no protection under La. R.S. 23:967 or 30:2027 for his
reports relative to the State's potential liability for acquisition of the Gillis Long Hansen Disease Center
insofar as the reports were required as part of his normal duties. See Sasse v. U.S. Dep‘t of Labor, 409
F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 2005).‖ Id.
217. Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 9 So. 3d 193 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
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adopting the exclusion.218
As with the Ohio statute, the language of the Louisiana environmental
protection whistleblower provision is at least somewhat at odds with the
job duties exclusion. The Louisiana statute explicitly covers reports
made to an employee‘s supervisor.219 Neither Matthews nor Stone
addressed this language. Nor, for that matter, did these decisions
address any statutory language before reaching the conclusion that the
job duties exclusion would apply. Similarly, these courts failed to
discuss the purpose of the Louisiana statute. In fact, the courts failed to
articulate any rationale whatsoever for adopting the job duties
exclusion.220
The fourth adoption of the job duties exclusion is found in MizeKurzman v. Marin Comm. College District.221 In Mize-Kurzman, the
trial court gave a limiting jury instruction on a state statutory
whistleblower claim that incorporated the job duties exclusion in
Huffman.222 The party‘s appellate brief indicated that the trial court
accepted Huffman, but there was no indication of the rationale behind
the decision.223 The case is on appeal, and it remains to be seen whether
the decision will stand.
Despite these applications of the job duties exclusion, employers have
not prevailed in every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue. In
Connecticut, the results for employers have been mixed, with public but
not private sector employee claims under the Connecticut statute being
subject to the job duties exclusion. Connecticut presents an interesting
case study of the influence of Garcetti because the state has a statute
codifying freedom of speech protections for employees in both
government and private sector that has been used as the source of
whistleblower protections by some employees.224 Even though the
218. In Stone, the parties discussed both Matthews and Sasse in their briefs; however, the court‘s
opinion states that it finds ―no Louisiana cases directly on point.‖ Id. at 200.
219. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027(A)(1) (2010).
220. See generally Stone, 9 So. 3d 193; Matthews v. Military Dep‘t, 970 So. 2d 1089 (La. Ct.
App. 2007).
221. Appellant‘s Opening Brief, Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Comm. Coll. Dist., No. A126937 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010), 2010 WL 3481775, at *20 (discussing trial court‘s decision).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2010) (providing that ―[a]ny employer . . . who subjects
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argument for adopting the job duties exclusion seems far more
compelling under such a statute, courts have, so far, been reluctant to
apply it to employees in the private sector. For instance, in 2007, a
Connecticut Superior Court refused to apply Garcetti to a private sector
employee who brought a claim under the Connecticut statute (§ 31-51q),
but provided no explanation other than the fact that Garcetti involved a
public employee.225 A more recent U.S. District Court decision
provided more substance while reaching the same conclusion. In Trusz,
the court indicated that Garcetti would not apply, noting that Garcetti‘s
holding applied only to public employees and that it ―[did] not follow
that the rationale for public workplace limitations delineated in Garcetti
should also apply to private workplaces.‖226 These cases suggest that
while Garcetti will not apply to private sector employee claims under
§ 31-51q, it will apply to government employees.
Since Garcetti, there has been only one case in which the result has
been a clear repudiation of the job duties exclusion. In Vera v. Sun Land
Beef Co.227 the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to adopt the
employer‘s argument to apply the job duties exclusion. The case
involved a former employee of a beef processing company who alleged
he was fired for reporting to his supervisor incidents where the company
violated a host of environmental laws.228 The former employee sued,
based in part on Arizona‘s whistleblower protection statute. On appeal,
the employer relied heavily on Garcetti and argued that the Huffman job
duties exclusion should apply to the Arizona whistleblower protection
statute.229 In rejecting this contention, the court noted:
any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights
guaranteed by the [F]irst [A]mendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4, or 14 of article
first of the Constitution of the state . . . shall be liable to such employee for damages . . . .‖).
Connecticut also has a general whistleblower protection statute which is more similar to the WPA and
the Minnesota and Texas statutes discussed previously. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (2010).
225. Lehmann v. Conn. Legal Rights Project, Inc., No. CV054018378, 2007 WL 1053941, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2007).
226. Trusz v. USB Realty Investors, L.L.C., No. 309cv268, 2010 WL 1287148, at *9 (D. Conn.
Mar. 30, 2010).
227. Vera v. Sun Land Beef Co., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0479, 2009 WL 532625 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar.
3, 2009).
228. Id. at *1.
229. See Appellant/Cross-Appellee‘s Opening Brief, Vera v. Sun Land Beef Co., No. 1 CA-CV
07-0479 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2007), 2007 WL 3047534, at *26–27.
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[Defendant] nevertheless contends that Vera's claim should be rejected
because he merely reported to [Defendant] issues that were public
knowledge and because he performed his regular employment duties in
making such warnings. However, these arguments are based on out-ofstate cases and statutes and cannot add to or subtract from the statutory
provisions set forth by A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii).‖230

This approach, while not an in-depth analysis of the issue, at least has
the virtue of considering the state‘s statutory language.
In short, before Garcetti was decided, employers sought to apply the
job duties exclusion in only a handful of cases, and no court adopted it.
Since Garcetti, however, employers more frequently argue the job
duties exclusion and with greater success. Six states have directly
addressed the job duties exclusion. Four of these have adopted it, one
shows signs of a mixed approach, adopting it for public employees but
not private sector employees, and only one has refused to adopt it.
V. FIGHTING THE INFECTION
Immediate action is required to prevent the job duties exclusion from
gaining greater acceptance. Three steps can be taken in this effort.
First, on the federal level, Congress should amend the WPA to overrule
Willis and Huffman and eliminate the job duties exclusion. The
necessary amendment is simple, and has been proposed several times in
the last few years, but it has never been enacted.231 An amendment
could expand the definition of a protected disclosure by adding the
following language: ―including a disclosure made in the ordinary course
of an employee's duties.‖232 Amending the WPA might also have an
impact beyond the federal employee whistleblower situation, as it would
discredit Huffman and Willis as a source of support for adopting the job
duties exclusion.
Second, at the state level legislatures can proactively amend
whistleblower protection statutes to explicitly protect job-related
230. Vera v. Sun Land Beef Co., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0479, 2009 WL 532625, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 2009).
231. See S. 274, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 995, 107th Cong. (2001).
232. This is the language that has been proposed by Senator Akaka, an ardent supporter of the
amendment, on numerous occasions. See S. 274, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 995, 107th Cong. (2001).
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disclosures. California and the District of Columbia recently became
the first jurisdictions to take this step.233 Both of these jurisdictions
revised the definition of a protected disclosure to explicitly include
reports made within the course of performing ordinary job duties.234
While California has taken one proactive step toward ensuring that
whistleblower protections are not eviscerated by the job duties
exclusion, not all whistleblowers are covered by this legislative fix.
California has numerous statutes protecting whistleblowers,235 and only
one of these, the primary source of protection for state governmental
employees, has been amended to affirmatively cover disclosures made
pursuant to one‘s job duties. Private sector whistleblowers are not
covered by the amendment. It may be that the legislature believed that
the job duties exclusion would only apply to public sector employees
and thus saw no need to amend the private sector whistleblower statutes.
However, as is evident from Kidwell, the job duties exclusion has been
applied to statutes that protect private sector employees. More work by
the legislature is needed to adequately protect California‘s private sector
employees.
In addition to legislative action, courts should be more cautious in
adopting the job duties exclusion. Courts should consider the precise
language in state statutes to determine whether the exclusion is
consistent with the statute. Further, while employers have legitimate
interests in controlling the workplace, and courts have concerns over
excessive volume of claims, existing doctrines can be used to address
these concerns more specifically and narrowly.
Foreclosing
whistleblowing protection to reports made pursuant to one‘s job and
within the chain of command without statutory authority for such a
broad exclusion represents judicial activism with potential to severely
constrict legitimate reporting of unlawful activity.

233. See 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 452 (West) (codified at CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 8547.2(d)); 2010
D.C. Laws 18-117, Act 18-265 (2010) (codified at D.C. CODE § 1-615.52(a)(6)).
234. See 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 452 (West) (codified at CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 8547.2(d); 2010
D.C. Laws 18-117, Act 18-265 (2010) (codified at D.C. CODE § 1-615.52(a)(6)).
235. For a listing of the most significant statutes providing generalized whistleblower protections,
see WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at app. A at 281, app. B at 309.
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